From agent99@relay.csd.SGI.COM Wed Dec 17 09:14:52 1997 From: SGI Security Coordinator To: agent99@sgi.com Date: Tue, 16 Dec 1997 17:40:47 -0800 Subject: SGI Security Advisory 19971201-01-P1391 - statd(1M) Buffer Overrun DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTIONS - NONE - FOR PUBLIC RELEASE -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory Title: Buffer Overrun Vulnerability in statd(1M) Program Title: AUSCERT AA-97.29 and CERT CA-97.26 Number: 19971201-01-P1391 Date: December 16, 1997 ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible. Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto, express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Silicon Graphics be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory. ______________________________________________________________________________ - ----------------------- - --- Issue Specifics --- - ----------------------- The statd(1M) program is a status monitoring program used to detect failures between clients and servers. Under normal operation, the statd program utilizes rpc routines to converse between client and server. Unfortunately, a buffer overrun has been discovered in the statd(1M) program which could allow arbitrary commands to be run as the privileged user root. Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED that these measures be implemented on ALL SGI systems. This issue will be corrected in future releases of IRIX. - -------------- - --- Impact --- - -------------- The statd program is installed on all Silicon Graphics IRIX systems by default. However, only the IRIX 5.3 statd program is vulnerable to this issue. With a local account, this vulnerability can be exploited locally and remotely. Depending on network configuration, this vulnerability can also be exploited without a local account. This vulnerability can be utilized to execute commands with root privileges. This vulnerability has been publically discussed in Usenet newsgroups and mailing lists and also reported in AUSCERT AA-97.29 and CERT CA-97.26 security advisories. - -------------------------- - --- Temporary Solution --- - -------------------------- Although patches are available for this issue, it is realized that there may be situations where installing the patches immediately may not be possible. The steps below can be used to disable the statd program from being started at system startup/reboot. 1) Become the root user on the system. % /bin/su - Password: # 2) Chkconfig the lockd program off which will in turn disable the statd program. # chkconfig lockd off ************ *** NOTE *** ************ Disabling lockd and in turn the statd programs will deactivate NFS stateful locking services. 3) At this point, to ensure proper closure and termination of lockd and statd programs, along with restart of NFS, a full system reboot is recommended. # reboot 4) After the system has rebooted, ensure that the statd program is not running, with the following command. No output should be returned from this command. % ps -ef | grep rpc.statd - ---------------- - --- Solution --- - ---------------- "In this section OS specifics are covered. We only really support 5.3 and up with patches. In some rare cases we will provide something for 4.x and 5.2 but that is getting rarer with time. For those OS releases that are not supported, we indicate that there is an upgrade path available to the customer. See some of the examples below. Also note the checksum area. Examples are below" OS Version Vulnerable? Patch # Other Actions ---------- ----------- ------- ------------- IRIX 3.x no IRIX 4.x no IRIX 5.0.x yes not avail Note 1 IRIX 5.1.x yes not avail Note 1 IRIX 5.2 yes not avail Note 1 IRIX 5.3 yes 1391 IRIX 6.0.x no IRIX 6.1 no IRIX 6.2 no IRIX 6.3 no IRIX 6.4 no NOTES 1) upgrade operating system or see "Temporary Solution" section. Patches are available via anonymous FTP and your service/support provider. The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1) or its mirror, ftp.sgi.com. Security information and patches can be found in the ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches directories, respectfully. ##### Patch File Checksums #### The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files: Filename: README.patch.1391 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 05716 12 README.patch.1391 Algorithm #2 (sum): 13181 12 README.patch.1391 MD5 checksum: 4B47A26AD798A2B91AFCD77BC8D53197 Filename: patchSG0001391 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 39403 4 patchSG0001391 Algorithm #2 (sum): 53279 4 patchSG0001391 MD5 checksum: C0FF368E0196D7DB9BDAC3C6732CCD44 Filename: patchSG0001391.eoe1_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 34891 39 patchSG0001391.eoe1_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 9211 39 patchSG0001391.eoe1_sw MD5 checksum: F31D4A11EEE282FA3A1BA7B1F3F02B10 Filename: patchSG0001391.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 15146 2 patchSG0001391.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 8184 2 patchSG0001391.idb MD5 checksum: 76F14AD66D8B8C4E6782772822023DBA Filename: patchSG0001391.nfs_man Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 60901 8 patchSG0001391.nfs_man Algorithm #2 (sum): 1520 8 patchSG0001391.nfs_man MD5 checksum: 83F5CE8E5463C45CE19C1B6B4BFFC817 Filename: patchSG0001391.nfs_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 40349 147 patchSG0001391.nfs_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 50891 147 patchSG0001391.nfs_sw MD5 checksum: 1701AD638C7E3D02A4C3F193DA7F4BBD - ------------------------ - --- Acknowledgments --- - ------------------------ Silicon Graphics wishes to thank the AUSCERT and CERT Coordination Center organizations for their assistance in this matter. - ----------------------------------------------------------- - --- Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Information/Contacts --- - ----------------------------------------------------------- If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@sgi.com. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely available to any person needing the information and is available via anonymous FTP and the Web. The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches, respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html. For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@sgi.com. For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please contact your SGI support provider. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a free security mailing list service called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web (http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/wiretap.html) or by sending email to SGI as outlined below. % mail wiretap-request@sgi.com subscribe wiretap end ^d In the example above, is the email address that you wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are finished composing the mail message. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site. This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html. ------oOo------ For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider. A support contract is not required for submitting a security report. ______________________________________________________________________________ This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, Silicon Graphics is appropriately credited and the document retains and includes its valid PGP signature. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBNJcklLQ4cFApAP75AQGJUgP/QB5MstxhIdO1i4WRjzLSnt8jOx0J9Yww FujuRH81sL2Viah/IdixJvU5M2Zc0I/cHA8q4p5ZnqOU3d0H2HWkai+bjgOP1XhA LmtV0aemFmeHH0fmfIKR0PLqbyTnN7DMglbR0pVJwvZ7azk50rin52ww2x+qaHik XXtLcJ/Uofk= =IiXO -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----