From raeburn@MIT.EDU Tue Jan 28 18:05:27 2003 From: Ken Raeburn To: kerberos-announce@MIT.EDU Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2003 16:58:13 -0500 Subject: MITKRB5-SA-2003-001: Multiple vulnerabilities in old releases of MIT Kerberos -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 MIT krb5 Security Advisory 2003-001 Original Release Date: 2003-01-28 Topic: Multiple vulnerabilities in old releases of MIT Kerberos Severity: CRITICAL: Remote user can crash KDC, and may be able to forge non-local identities and compromise the KDC or application servers. SUMMARY ======= Multiple vulnerabilities have been found in MIT Kerberos 5 releases prior to release 1.2.5. MIT recommends updating to 1.2.7 if possible. IMPACT ====== * A remote user can crash the KDC. * A user authenticated in a remote realm may be able to claim to be other non-local users to an application server. * It may be possible for a user to gain access to the KDC system and database. AFFECTED SOFTWARE ================= * All releases of MIT Kerberos 5 before 1.2.5. FIX === MIT recommends updating to release 1.2.5 or later, preferably to the latest release. Patches specifically to fix these problems are not available at this time. This announcement and related security advisories may be found on the MIT Kerberos security advisory page at: http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/advisories/index.html The main MIT Kerberos web page is at: http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/index.html ACKNOWLEDGMENTS =============== Thanks to greg pryzby, Joseph Sokol-Margolis, Gerald Britton, E. Larry Lidz, and CERT for reporting these problems. DETAILS ======= Problem 1: KDC null pointer dereferences ________________________________________ Certain protocol requests, compliant with the protocol encoding scheme but indicative of a client system most likely configured incorrectly, can crash a KDC with a null pointer dereference. We do not believe any exploit to gain access to the KDC or otherwise alter its behavior is possible on systems without storage mapped at address zero. We have not explored the effects of this on a system with mapped memory at address zero. The fallback and retransmit algorithm used in the MIT krb5 library will cause an application not receiving a reply from a KDC to try other KDCs in the same realm; it will iterate through this list a few times, or until it gets a response. Thus, one client may take down multiple KDCs. We believe this vulnerability is limited to the TGS-REQ exchange, that is, cases where the user has already authenticated to the KDC or one with which it shares inter-realm keys. So (ignoring cases of well-known passwords) there is an audit trail of sorts, even if it has to be dug out of a core file, and it is not a simple, scriptable attack against KDCs in general. Workarounds: - Start your KDC from inittab or a loop in a shell script. (The inittab approach may not work well if the KDC is crashed too often in a short span of time.) Thanks to greg pryzby for reporting this problem. Problem 2: realm transit checks _______________________________ Realms with shared keys can impersonate people in other non-local realms in certain cases. It may be exploitable in various ways if non-local principal names are on critical ACLs. This vulnerability affects both the KDC and Kerberos application servers. This problem was fixed in the 1.2.3 release. That release also added a flag to the KDC config file that can be set to refuse untrusted cross-realm authentication, in case application servers cannot be updated quickly enough. This is not recommended as a long-term solution, because the current model we use says that the application server is responsible for doing this validation, which allows (for example) a service on a specific machine (perhaps one set up for software testing) to be configured to know about authentication paths known to the maintainer of the service, even if the maintainer of the KDC does not trust these paths for general use within the realm. Enforcing this limitation in the KDC takes this option away from the maintainers of individual machines. Workarounds: - Delete or change inter-realm keys so inter-realm authentication is disabled. - Remove all non-local principals from all critical ACLs in services using old MIT Kerberos code to validate the realm transit path Thanks to Joseph Sokol-Margolis and Gerald Britton for finding this problem. Problem 3: format strings _________________________ Older versions of the MIT KDC used strings containing Kerberos principal names as printf-style format strings in logging routines. At least some cases do not require successful authentication, so this can be used as a remote, anonymous attack. It is easy to crash the KDC with this exploit. We do not know of any exploits to gain access to the host system, but we do not rule out the possibility. Workarounds: See under problem 1. ***However, these do not address the host access possibility.*** Thanks to E. Larry Lidz for discovering this problem. Problem 4: bounds checking on data sizes ________________________________________ Some of our code does not do bounds checking on lengths before allocating storage. On some systems, attempting to allocate large negative amounts of storage can crash the program. Thus, some bogus packets may crash the KDC or an application server using Kerberos. We do not believe this can be exploited to gain access to the host system. Workarounds: - start KDC in a loop in a script, or from inittab - do likewise for any server processes that need to handle multiple client connections Thanks to CERT for bringing this to our attention. REVISION HISTORY ================ 2003-01-28 original release -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (GNU/Linux) Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org iD8DBQE+Nvz7UqOaDMQ+e5gRAsTXAKDnR5W9BAF29BN+LTA6Vf0VE8IEaACffUxa q3ZwHRinV/lW5Hc1pgvxI3U= =KrXi -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----