****************************************************************************** ------ ----- ----- --- ----- | ----- ---- | | | | | |--- | | | | | | | | | |-- | | | | |-- | | | | | | | | \ | | ----- ---- ----- ----- | \ ----- A D V I S O R Y FA-97.77 ****************************************************************************** Topic: IBM AIX portmir command Vulnerability Source: CIAC Creation Date: October 29, 1997 21:00 GMT Last Updated: To aid in the wide distribution of essential security information, FedCIRC is forwarding the following information from CIAC bulletin I-011. FedCIRC urges you to act on this information as soon as possible. If you have any questions, please contact FedCIRC: Telephone: +1 888 282 0870 Email: fedcirc@fedcirc.gov =======================FORWARDED TEXT STARTS HERE============================ [ For Public Release ] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- __________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN IBM AIX portmir command Vulnerability October 29, 1997 21:00 GMT Number I-011 ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: Several vulnerabilities exist in the portmir command. PLATFORM: IBM AIX(r) 4.2.1 DAMAGE: Local users may become root. SOLUTION: Remove the setuid bit from /usr/sbin/portmir and apply the fixes below. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY The information on this vulnerability should be acted upon as ASSESSMENT: soon as possible to avoid possible unauthorized access. ______________________________________________________________________________ [ Start IBM Advisory ] ======= ============ ====== ====== ======= ============== ======= ======= === === ==== ====== ====== === =========== ======= ======= === =========== === ======= === === === ==== === ===== === ======= ============== ===== === ===== ======= ============ ===== = ===== EMERGENCY RESPONSE SERVICE SECURITY VULNERABILITY ALERT 29 October 1997 19:00 GMT Number: ERS-SVA-E01-1997:006.1 ============================================================================== VULNERABILITY SUMMARY VULNERABILITY: Buffer overflow and insecure log files in the AIX portmir command PLATFORMS: IBM AIX(r) 4.2.1 SOLUTION: Remove the setuid bit from /usr/sbin/portmir THREAT: Local users can become root ============================================================================== DETAILED INFORMATION I. Description Several vulnerabilities exist in the portmir command that can allow local Users to become root. This command was added in 4.2.1; therefore, 4.1 and 3.2 Are not vulnerable. II. Impact Local users can become root. III. Fixes A. How to alleviate the problem Run the following command (as root) to close this vulnerability until APARs can be applied: # chmod u-s /usr/sbin/portmir B. Official fix Apply the following fix to your system: APAR - IX71795 To determine if you have this APAR on your system, run the following command: instfix -ik IX71795 Or run the following command: lslpp -h bos.sysmgt.serv_aid Your version of bos.sysmgt.serv_aid should be 4.2.1.4 or later. C. To Order APARs may be ordered using Electronic Fix Distribution (via FixDist) or from the IBM Support Center. For more information on FixDist, reference URL: http://service.software.ibm.com/aixsupport/ or send e-mail to aixserv@austin.ibm.com with a subject of "FixDist". IV. Contact Information To request the PGP public key that can be used to encrypt new AIX security vulnerabilities, send email to security-alert@austin.ibm.com with a subject of "get key". If you would like to subscribe to the AIX security newsletter, send a note to aixserv@austin.ibm.com with a subject of "subscribe Security". To cancel your subscription, use a subject of "unsubscribe Security". To see a list of other available subscriptions, use a subject of "help". IBM and AIX are registered trademarks of International Business Machines Corporation. All other trademarks are property of their respective holders. ============================================================================== IBM's Internet Emergency Response Service (IBM-ERS) is a subscription-based Internet security response service that includes computer security incident response and management, regular electronic verification of your Internet gateway(s), and security vulnerability alerts similar to this one that are tailored to your specific computing environment. By acting as an extension of your own internal security staff, IBM-ERS's team of Internet security experts helps you quickly detect and respond to attacks and exposures across your Internet connection(s). As a part of IBM's Business Recovery Services organization, the IBM Internet Emergency Response Service is a component of IBM's SecureWay(tm) line of security products and services. From hardware to software to consulting, SecureWay solutions can give you the assurance and expertise you need to protect your valuable business resources. To find out more about the IBM Internet Emergency Response Service, send an electronic mail message to ers-sales@vnet.ibm.com, or call 1-800-742-2493 (Prompt 4). IBM-ERS maintains a site on the World Wide Web at http://www.ers.ibm.com/. Visit the site for information about the service, copies of security alerts, team contact information, and other items. IBM-ERS uses Pretty Good Privacy* (PGP*) as the digital signature mechanism for security vulnerability alerts and other distributed information. The IBM-ERS PGP* public key is available from http://www.ers.ibm.com/team- info/pgpkey.html. "Pretty Good Privacy" and "PGP" are trademarks of Philip Zimmermann. IBM-ERS is a Member Team of the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), a global organization established to foster cooperation and response coordination among computer security teams worldwide. Copyright 1997 International Business Machines Corporation. The information in this document is provided as a service to customers of the IBM Emergency Response Service. Neither International Business Machines Corporation, Integrated Systems Solutions Corporation, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process contained herein, or represents that its use would not infringe any privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by IBM or its subsidiaries. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of IBM or its subsidiaries, and may not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. The material in this security alert may be reproduced and distributed, without permission, in whole or in part, by other security incident response teams (both commercial and non-commercial), provided the above copyright is kept intact and due credit is given to IBM-ERS. This security alert may be reproduced and distributed, without permission, in its entirety only, by any person provided such reproduction and/or distribution is performed for non-commercial purposes and with the intent of increasing the awareness of the Internet community. [ End IBM Advisory ] ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of IBM for the information contained in this bulletin. ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC can be contacted at: Voice: +1 510-422-8193 FAX: +1 510-423-8002 STU-III: +1 510-423-2604 E-mail: ciac@llnl.gov For emergencies and off-hour assistance, DOE, DOE contractor sites, and the NIH may contact CIAC 24-hours a day. During off hours (5PM - 8AM PST), call the CIAC voice number 510-422-8193 and leave a message, or call 800-759-7243 (800-SKY-PAGE) to send a Sky Page. CIAC has two Sky Page PIN numbers, the primary PIN number, 8550070, is for the CIAC duty person, and the secondary PIN number, 8550074 is for the CIAC Project Leader. Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive. World Wide Web: http://ciac.llnl.gov/ Anonymous FTP: ciac.llnl.gov (198.128.39.53) Modem access: +1 (510) 423-4753 (28.8K baud) +1 (510) 423-3331 (28.8K baud) CIAC has several self-subscribing mailing lists for electronic publications: 1. CIAC-BULLETIN for Advisories, highest priority - time critical information and Bulletins, important computer security information; 2. SPI-ANNOUNCE for official news about Security Profile Inspector (SPI) software updates, new features, distribution and availability; 3. SPI-NOTES, for discussion of problems and solutions regarding the use of SPI products. Our mailing lists are managed by a public domain software package called Majordomo, which ignores E-mail header subject lines. To subscribe (add yourself) to one of our mailing lists, send the following request as the E-mail message body, substituting ciac-bulletin, spi-announce OR spi-notes for list-name: E-mail to ciac-listproc@llnl.gov or majordomo@tholia.llnl.gov: subscribe list-name e.g., subscribe ciac-bulletin You will receive an acknowledgment email immediately with a confirmation that you will need to mail back to the addresses above, as per the instructions in the email. This is a partial protection to make sure you are really the one who asked to be signed up for the list in question. If you include the word 'help' in the body of an email to the above address, it will also send back an information file on how to subscribe/unsubscribe, get past issues of CIAC bulletins via email, etc. PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these communities, please contact your agency's response team to report incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. LAST 10 CIAC BULLETINS ISSUED (Previous bulletins available from CIAC) H-110: Samba Servers Vulnerability I-001: HP-UX Denial of Service via telnet Vulnerability I-002: Cisco CHAP Authentication Vulnerability I-003: HP-UX mediainit(1) Vulnerability I-004: NEC/UNIX "nosuid" mount option Vulnerability I-006: IBM AIX "xdat" Buffer Overflow Vulnerability I-007: Sun Solaris Vulnerabilities (nis_cachemgr, ftpd/rlogind, sysdef) I-008: Open Group OSF/DCE Denial-of-Service Vulnerability I-009: HP-UX CDE Vulnerability I-010: IBM AIX Vulnerabilities (libDtSvc.a, piodmgrsu, nslookup) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 4.0 Business Edition iQCVAwUBNFplVbnzJzdsy3QZAQEmJAP/adybX4M9qvdWb7T1BbHD/d/IyVThlsFg 09UGWP+PMANGwldDbnBJsMneCerru+ydEJLg7cPcNBf6V5Pn/xBXsrrB6/8pRxWL cIOV1TT9BLT2iVRB34D9qowkc7dmnRzinsXcqMPVMUPc298+scosq6FB5Y7tv+0B VoCF2KZsjno= =qsS6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ========================FORWARDED TEXT ENDS HERE============================= The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has established a Federal Computer Incident response Capability (FedCIRC) to assist federal civilians agencies in their incident handling efforts by providing proactive and reactive computer security related services. FedCIRC is a partnership among NIST, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability (CIAC), and the CERT* Coordination Center (CERT/CC). If you believe that your system has been compromised, please contact FedCIRC: Telephone: +1 888 282 0870 Email: fedcirc@fedcirc.gov Web Server: http://www.fedcirc.gov/ * Registered in U.S. Patent and Trademark Office The CERT Coordination Center is part of the Software Engineering Institute. The Software Engineering Institute is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense. CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.