****************************************************************************** ------ ----- ----- --- ----- | ----- ---- | | | | | |--- | | | | | | | | | |-- | | | | |-- | | | | | | | | \ | | ----- ---- ----- ----- | \ ----- A D V I S O R Y 97.57 ****************************************************************************** Topic: IRIX webdist.cgi, handler and wrap programs Source: CERT/CC Creation Date: August 28, 1997 Last Updated: To aid in the wide distribution of essential security information, FedCIRC is forwarding the following information from CERT/CC vendor bulletin VB-97.07.sgi. FedCIRC urges you to act on this information as soon as possible. If you have any questions, please contact FedCIRC: Telephone: +1 888 282 0870 Email: fedcirc@fedcirc.gov =======================FORWARDED TEXT STARTS HERE============================ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ============================================================================= CERT* Vendor-Initiated Bulletin VB-97.07 August 28, 1997 Topic: IRIX webdist.cgi, handler and wrap programs Source: Silicon Graphics Inc. Related CERT documents: CERT Advisory CA-97.12.webdist To aid in the wide distribution of essential security information, the CERT Coordination Center is forwarding the following information from Silicon Graphics Inc. (SGI). SGI urges you to act on this information as soon as possible. SGI contact information is included in the forwarded text below; please contact them if you have any questions or need further information. =======================FORWARDED TEXT STARTS HERE============================ - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory Title: IRIX webdist.cgi, handler and wrap programs Title: CERT Advisory CA-97.12, AUSCERT Advisory AA-97.14 Number: 19970501-02-PX Date: August 26, 1997 ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible. Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto, express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Silicon Graphics be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory. ______________________________________________________________________________ - - ----------------------- - - --- Issue Specifics --- - - ----------------------- Several programs provided with the Outbox Environment subsystem have been found to be insecure. These are the cgi-bin programs webdist.cgi, handler and wrap available for IRIX 5.x and 6.x. Each of these programs can be manipulated to execute arbitrary commands with potentially elevated privileges. Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED that these measures be implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI systems. This issue will be corrected in future releases of IRIX. - - -------------- - - --- Impact --- - - -------------- In general, the Outbox subsystem is install by default on all SGI systems starting with IRIX 6.2. However, IRIX 5.x and pre-IRIX 6.2 systems may have the Outbox subsystem as part of the Desktop software package. For these particular vulnerabilities, a local account is not required. Furthermore, each of these vulnerabilities can be exploited remotely. Utilizing these vulnerabilities, arbitrary commands can be executed with httpd daemon privileges. Depending on configuration of the http server, privileged access may be possible. This issue has been publically disclosed and discussed in several public forums including the BUGTRAQ mailing list in addition to security advisories CERT CA-97.12 and AUSCERT AA-97.14 - - ---------------------- - - --- Software Check --- - - ---------------------- To determine if the Outbox software is installed on a particular system, the following command can be used: % /usr/sbin/versions outbox.sw I = Installed, R = Removed Name Date Description I outbox 03/23/97 Outbox Environment, 1.2 I outbox.sw 03/23/97 Outbox End-User Software, 1.2 I outbox.sw.outbox 03/23/97 Outbox Software Tools, 1.2 I outbox.sw.webdist 03/23/97 Web Software Distribution Tools, 1.2 In the above case, the Outbox software is installed and the steps in either the "Temporary Solution" or "Solution" section should be completed. - - -------------------------- - - --- Temporary Solution --- - - -------------------------- Although patches are available to address the vulnerabilities in these programs, it is realized that there may be situations where installing the patches immediately may not be possible. Below, two possible solutions are provided to remove the vulnerabilities. In Solution A program permissions are changed while in Solution B the Outbox subsystem is removed. Either solution can be used depending on site requirements. Solution A - Change program permissions. The steps below can be used to remove the vulnerabilities by removing the permissions of the vulnerable programs. The default installation places these files in /var/www/cgi-bin, however, all cgi-bin directories on a system should be checked for these programs. 1) Become the root user on the system. % /bin/su - Password: # 2) Change the permissions on the programs. # /bin/chmod 400 /var/www/cgi-bin/webdist.cgi # /bin/chmod 400 /var/www/cgi-bin/handler # /bin/chmod 400 /var/www/cgi-bin/wrap ************ *** NOTE *** ************ By changing the permissions on these programs as above, these programs can not be executed by any user. 3) Return to previous level. # exit $ Solution B - Removal of the Outbox software. 1) Become the root user on the system. % /bin/su - Password: # 2) Remove the vulnerable outbox subsystem. # /usr/sbin/versions -v remove outbox 3) Return to previous level. # exit $ - - ---------------- - - --- Solution --- - - ---------------- OS Version Vulnerable? Patch # Other Actions ---------- ----------- ------- ------------- IRIX 3.x no IRIX 4.x no IRIX 5.0.x no IRIX 5.1.x no IRIX 5.2 no IRIX 5.3 yes 2315 IRIX 6.0.x yes not avail Note 1 IRIX 6.1 yes not avail Note 1 IRIX 6.2 yes 2314 IRIX 6.3 yes 2338 IRIX 6.4 yes 2338 NOTES 1) upgrade operating system or see "Temporary Solution" section. Patches are available via anonymous FTP and your service/support provider. The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1) or its mirror, ftp.sgi.com. Security information and patches can be found in the ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches directories, respectfully. ##### Patch File Checksums #### The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files: Filename: README.patch.2315 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 25011 11 README.patch.2315 Algorithm #2 (sum): 39892 11 README.patch.2315 MD5 checksum: 9B5B74574022FEE0259307C44A4602C0 Filename: patchSG0002315 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 44474 2 patchSG0002315 Algorithm #2 (sum): 48055 2 patchSG0002315 MD5 checksum: 0C9FA667D42B3FC6895C5AD612CE4FB1 Filename: patchSG0002315.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 27036 3 patchSG0002315.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 23448 3 patchSG0002315.idb MD5 checksum: 3DEEA538437CC5D96488269715948F31 Filename: patchSG0002315.outbox_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 38552 35 patchSG0002315.outbox_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 34937 35 patchSG0002315.outbox_sw MD5 checksum: 0655A31A55306B4272FD00796CF69466 Filename: README.patch.2314 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 10949 11 README.patch.2314 Algorithm #2 (sum): 39885 11 README.patch.2314 MD5 checksum: E2BFB467EF18F1D5B5CDCE5FBDC3F36D Filename: patchSG0002314 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 18667 2 patchSG0002314 Algorithm #2 (sum): 51210 2 patchSG0002314 MD5 checksum: FE7C82E22CD63CC278C011FE80F3265A Filename: patchSG0002314.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 23116 3 patchSG0002314.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 23091 3 patchSG0002314.idb MD5 checksum: CB3E71D4FB3D86192E15EE59AED8A296 Filename: patchSG0002314.outbox_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 56643 35 patchSG0002314.outbox_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 28391 35 patchSG0002314.outbox_sw MD5 checksum: 5CC76625AB89FF2862EB21111E7924F0 Filename: README.patch.2338 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 39046 13 README.patch.2338 Algorithm #2 (sum): 48961 13 README.patch.2338 MD5 checksum: D568381EF9948399D50663C2CB9175E8 Filename: patchSG0002338 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 41914 3 patchSG0002338 Algorithm #2 (sum): 15225 3 patchSG0002338 MD5 checksum: 18845B0651DC6CCED5E92694915DB36D Filename: patchSG0002338.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 32107 4 patchSG0002338.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 19674 4 patchSG0002338.idb MD5 checksum: 351DFB48864622C3B8219CC88526F5BE Filename: patchSG0002338.outbox_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 36841 107 patchSG0002338.outbox_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 12878 107 patchSG0002338.outbox_sw MD5 checksum: 2269AB01C700BB39E1CCF1849FAC70AF - - ------------------------ - - --- Acknowledgments --- - - ------------------------ Silicon Graphics wishes to thank the CERT Coordination Center, and AUSCERT for their assistance in this matter. - - ----------------------------------------------------------- - - --- Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Information/Contacts --- - - ----------------------------------------------------------- If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@sgi.com. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely available to any person needing the information and is available via anonymous FTP and the Web. The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches, respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html. For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@sgi.com. For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please contact your SGI support provider. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a free security mailing list service called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web (http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/wiretap.html) or by sending email to SGI as outlined below. % mail wiretap-request@sgi.com subscribe wiretap end ^d In the example above, is the email address that you wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are finished composing the mail message. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site. This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html. ------oOo------ For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider. A support contract is not required for submitting a security report. ______________________________________________________________________________ This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, Silicon Graphics is appropriately credited and the document retains and includes its valid PGP signature. - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBNAOdcLQ4cFApAP75AQEggQP9GCHJnOvD+zZq/8sekupSCK4aaIWFlpqh OsuLG9IeieNF42ePHMe0C/odHg1grg/FdLdnY0Pgg5SocR3acOEzsPxhEPnNOFwo Q358tu3G2tndxM2ULwVrw+COl3naWZYzwOyWPEjxfTI1VwId7/Tq3gUQ3vhuxVYI 8km5METDoJE= =KOAH - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ========================FORWARDED TEXT ENDS HERE============================= If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact the CERT Coordination Center or your representative in the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST). See http://www.first.org/team-info/. We strongly urge you to encrypt any sensitive information you send by email. The CERT Coordination Center can support a shared DES key and PGP. Contact the CERT staff for more information. Location of CERT PGP key ftp://info.cert.org/pub/CERT_PGP.key CERT Contact Information - ------------------------ Email cert@cert.org Phone +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline) CERT personnel answer 8:30-5:00 p.m. EST (GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4), and are on call for emergencies during other hours. Fax +1 412-268-6989 Postal address CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890 USA CERT publications, information about FIRST representatives, and other security-related information are available from http://www.cert.org/ ftp://info.cert.org/pub/ CERT advisories and bulletins are also posted on the USENET newsgroup comp.security.announce To be added to our mailing list for CERT advisories and bulletins, send your email address to cert-advisory-request@cert.org In the subject line, type SUBSCRIBE your-email-address * Registered U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. The CERT Coordination Center is part of the Software Engineering Institute (SEI). The SEI is sponsored by the U. S. Department of Defense. This file: ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_bulletins/VB-97.07.sgi -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBNAWE5HVP+x0t4w7BAQHiLQP/X9aNwqC8l76z/K9xFIbUCPvhVNE6mEV2 N0KNkbrAsycWd6LY1sS6kU3fd/y6lK4mrrokoP75ymaRuPQaOBs32Q4YNh1wnJYO cG8wTqBuzkpxwj5bsJbJUHSjc/EmjydausWOl6CYW9YFX3rMs19aXk4mOXmPgHuq 4sols7J2zfQ= =y7ws -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ========================FORWARDED TEXT ENDS HERE============================= The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has established a Federal Computer Incident response Capability (FedCIRC) to assist federal civilians agencies in their incident handling efforts by providing proactive and reactive computer security related services. FedCIRC is a partnership among NIST, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability (CIAC), and the CERT* Coordination Center (CERT/CC). If you believe that your system has been compromised, please contact FedCIRC: Telephone: +1 888 282 0870 Email: fedcirc@fedcirc.gov Web Server: http://www.fedcirc.gov/ * Registered in U.S. Patent and Trademark Office The CERT Coordination Center is part of the Software Engineering Institute. The Software Engineering Institute is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense. CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.