-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ****************************************************************************** ------ ----- ----- --- ----- | ----- ---- | | | | | |--- | | | | | | | | | |-- | | | | |-- | | | | | | | | \ | | ----- ---- ----- ----- | \ ----- A D V I S O R Y 97.03 ****************************************************************************** Topic: Vulnerability in IMAP and POP Source: CERT/CC Creation Date: April 7, 1997 Last Updated: May 1, 1997 To aid in the wide distribution of essential security information, FedCIRC is forwarding the following information from . FedCIRC urges you to act on this information as soon as possible. If you have any questions, please contact FedCIRC: Telephone: +1 888 282 0870 Email: fedcirc@fedcirc.gov =======================FORWARDED TEXT STARTS HERE============================ ============================================================================= CERT* Advisory CA-97.09 Original issue date: April 7, 1997 Last revised: May 1, 1997 Section III.A and Appendix - Added vendor information for Microsoft Corporation Topic: Vulnerability in IMAP and POP - - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- The CERT Coordination Center has received reports of a vulnerability in some versions of the Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) and Post Office Protocol (POP) implementations (imapd, ipop2d, and ipop3d). Information about this vulnerability has been publicly distributed. By exploiting this vulnerability, remote users can obtain unauthorized root access. The CERT/CC team recommends installing a patch if one is available or upgrading to IMAP4rev1. Until you can do so, we recommend disabling the IMAP and POP services at your site. We will update this advisory as we receive additional information. Please check our advisory files regularly for updates that relate to your site. - - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- I. Description The current version of Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) supports both online and offline operation, permitting manipulation of remote message folders. It provides access to multiple mailboxes (possibly on multiple servers), and supports nested mailboxes as well as resynchronization with the server. The current version also provides a user with the ability to create, delete, and rename mailboxes. Additional details concerning the functionality of IMAP can be found in RFC 2060 (the IMAP4rev1 specification) available from http://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc2060.txt The Post Office Protocol (POP) was designed to support offline mail processing. That is, the client connects to the server to download mail that the server is holding for the client. The mail is deleted from the server and is handled offline (locally) on the client machine. In both protocols, the server must run with root privileges so it can access mail folders and undertake some file manipulation on behalf of the user logging in. After login, these privileges are discarded. However, a vulnerability exists in the way the login transaction is handled, and this can be exploited to gain privileged access on the server. By preparing carefully crafted text to a system running a vulnerable version of these servers, remote users may be able to cause a buffer overflow and execute arbitrary instructions with root privileges. Information about this vulnerability has been widely distributed. II. Impact Remote users can obtain root access on systems running a vulnerable IMAP or POP server. They do not need access to an account on the system to do this. III. Solution Install a patch from your vendor (see Section A) or upgrade to the latest version of IMAP (Section B). If your POP server is based on the University of Washington IMAP server code, you should also upgrade to the latest version of IMAP. Until you can take one of these actions, you should disable services (Section C). In all cases, we urge you to take the additional precaution described in Section D. A. Obtain and install a patch from your vendor Below is a list of vendors who have provided information about this vulnerability. Details are in Appendix A of this advisory; we will update the appendix as we receive more information. If your vendor's name is not on this list, please contact your vendor directly. Berkeley Software Design, Inc. (BSDI) Carnegie Mellon University Cray Research Digital Equipment Corporation Linux - Caldera, Inc. Debian Red Hat Microsoft Corporation Netscape QUALCOMM, Incorporated Sun Microsystems, Inc. University of Washington B. Upgrade to the latest version of IMAP An alternative to installing vendor patches is upgrading to IMAP4rev1, which is available from ftp://ftp.cac.washington.edu/mail/imap.tar.Z Please note that checksums change when files are updated. The imap.tar.Z file can undergo frequent changes, therefore the checksums have not been included here. C. Disable services Until you can take one of the above actions, temporarily disable the POP and IMAP services. On many systems, you will need to edit the /etc/inetd.conf file. However, you should check your vendor's documentation because systems vary in file location and the exact changes required (for example, sending the inetd process a HUP signal or killing and restarting the daemon). If you are not able to temporarily disable the POP and IMAP services, then you should at least limit access to the vulnerable services to machines in your local network. This can be done by installing the tcp_wrappers described in Section D, not only for logging but also for access control. Note that even with access control via tcp_wrappers, you are still vulnerable to attacks from hosts that are allowed to connect to the vulnerable POP or IMAP service. D. Additional precaution Because IMAP or POP is launched out of inetd.conf, tcp_wrappers can be installed to log connections which can then be examined for suspicious activity. You may want to consider filtering connections at the firewall to discard unwanted/unauthorized connections. The tcp_wrappers tool is available in ftp://info.cert.org/pub/tools/tcp_wrappers/tcp_wrappers_7.5.tar.gz MD5 (tcp_wrappers_7.5.tar.gz) = 8c7a17a12d9be746e0488f7f6bfa4abb Note that this precaution does not address the vulnerability described in this advisory, but it is a good security practice in general. ........................................................................... Appendix A - Vendor Information Below is a list of the vendors who have provided information for this advisory. We will update this appendix as we receive additional information. If you do not see your vendor's name, the CERT/CC did not hear from that vendor. Please contact the vendor directly. Berkeley Software Design, Inc. (BSDI) ===================================== We're working on patches for both BSD/OS 2.1 and BSD/OS 3.0 for imap (which we include as part of pine). Carnegie Mellon University ========================== Cyrus Server 1.5.2, with full IMAP4rev1 and pop3 capabilities, is NOT affected by this report and is NOT vulnerable. Cray Research ============= Not vulnerable. Digital Equipment Corporation ============================= This reported problem is not present for Digital's UNIX or Digital ULTRIX Operating Systems Software. Linux Systems ============= Caldera, Inc. ------------- On systems such as Caldera OpenLinux 1.0, an unprivileged user can obtain root access. As a temporary workaround, you can disable the POP and IMAP services in /etc/inetd.conf, and then kill and restart inetd. A better solution is to install the new RPM package that contains the fixed versions of the IMAP and POP daemons. They are located on Caldera's FTP server (ftp.caldera.com): /pub/openlinux/updates/1.0/006/RPMS/imap-4.1.BETA-1.i386.rpm The MD5 checksum (from the "md5sum" command) for this package is: 45a758dfd30f6d0291325894f9ec4c18 This and other Caldera security resources are located at: http://www.caldera.com/tech-ref/security/ Debian ------ Debian linux is not vulnerable. For more information see http://cgi.debian.org/www-master/debian.org/security.html Red Hat ------- The IMAP servers included with all versions of Red Hat Linux have a buffer overrun which allow *remote* users to gain root access on systems which run them. A fix for Red Hat 4.1 is now available (details on it at the end of this note). Users of Red Hat 4.0 should apply the Red Hat 4.1 fix. Users of previous releases of Red Hat Linux are strongly encouraged to upgrade or simply not run imap. You can remove imap from any machine running with Red Hat Linux 2.0 or later by running the command "rpm -e imap", rendering them immune to this problem. All of the new packages are PGP signed with Red Hat's PGP key, and may be obtained from ftp.redhat.com:/updates/4.1. If you have direct Internet access, you may upgrade these packages on your system with the following commands: Intel: rpm -Uvh ftp://ftp.redhat.com/updates/4.1/i386/imap-4.1.BETA-3.i386.rpm MD5 (imap-4.1.BETA-3.i386.rpm) = 8ac64fff475ee43d409fc9776a6637a6 Alpha: rpm -Uvh ftp://ftp.redhat.com/updates/4.1/alpha/imap-4.1.BETA-3.alpha.rpm MD5 (imap-4.1.BETA-3.alpha.rpm) = fd42ac24d7c4367ee51fd00e631cae5b SPARC: rpm -Uvh ftp://ftp.redhat.com/updates/4.1/sparc/imap-4.1.BETA-3.sparc.rpm MD5 (imap-4.1.BETA-3.sparc.rpm) = 751598aae3d179284b8ea4d7a9b78868 Microsoft ========= Microsoft's Exchange POP and IMAP servers and Microsoft's Commericial Internet System are not vulnerable Netscape ======== Netscape's POP3/IMAP4 implementation is not vulnerable. QUALCOMM Incorporated ====================== Our engineers have examined the QPopper source code, which is based on source from UC Berkeley. They determined that QPopper is *NOT* vulnerable to a buffer overflow attack as described in CA-97.09. It strictly checks the size of messages before copying them into its buffer. Sun Microsystems, Inc. ====================== Not vulnerable. University of Washington ======================== This vulnerability has been detected in the University of Washington c-client library used in the UW IMAP and POP servers. This vulnerability affects all versions of imapd prior to v10.165, all versions of ipop2d prior to 2.3(32), and all versions of ipop3d prior to 3.3(27). It is recommended that all sites using these servers upgrade to the latest versions, available in the UW IMAP toolkit: ftp://ftp.cac.washington.edu/mail/imap.tar.Z Please note that checksums change when files are updated. The imap.tar.Z file can undergo frequent changes, therefore the checksums have not been included here. This is a source distribution which includes imapd, ipop2d, ipop3d. and the c-client library. The IMAP server in this distribution conforms with RFC2060 (the IMAP4rev1 specification). Sites which are not yet prepared to upgrade from IMAP2bis to IMAP4 service may obtain a corrected IMAP2bis server as part of the latest (3.96) UW Pine distribution, available at: ftp://ftp.cac.washington.edu/pine/pine.tar.Z MD5 (pine.tar.Z) = 37138f0d1ec3175cf1ffe6c062c9abbf - - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- The CERT Coordination Center thanks the University of Washington's Computing and Communications staff for information relating to this advisory. We also thank Wolfgang Ley of DFN-CERT for his input. We thank Matthew Wall of Carnegie Mellon University for additional insightful feedback. - - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact the CERT Coordination Center or your representative in the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (see http://www.first.org/team-info) CERT/CC Contact Information - - --------------------------- Email cert@cert.org Phone +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline) CERT personnel answer 8:30-5:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5) / EDT(GMT-4) and are on call for emergencies during other hours. Fax +1 412-268-6989 Postal address CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890 USA Using encryption We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email. We can support a shared DES key or PGP. Contact the CERT/CC for more information. Location of CERT PGP key ftp://info.cert.org/pub/CERT_PGP.key Getting security information CERT publications and other security information are available from http://www.cert.org/ ftp://info.cert.org/pub/ CERT advisories and bulletins are also posted on the USENET newsgroup comp.security.announce To be added to our mailing list for advisories and bulletins, send email to cert-advisory-request@cert.org In the subject line, type SUBSCRIBE your-email-address - - --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 1997 Carnegie Mellon University This material may be reproduced and distributed without permission provided it is used for noncommercial purposes and the copyright statement is included. * Registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. - - --------------------------------------------------------------------------- This file: ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/CA-97.09.imap_pop http://www.cert.org click on "CERT Advisories" =========================================================================== UPDATES April 8, 1997 - - ------------- We have received requests for clarification. The vulnerability described in this advisory relates to certain server implementations and is not in the protocol itself. See Appendix A for vendor and server information. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Revision history May 1, 1997 Section III.A and Appendix A - Added vendor information for Microsoft Corporation. Apr 18, 1997 Section III.A and Appendix A - Added vendor information for Debian and Netscape. Apr 11, 1997 Section III.B. - Removed checksum information for the imap.tar.Z distribution and added an explanation. Apr 9, 1997 Appendix A - added vendor information for Digital Equipment Corporation and QUALCOMM Incorporated. Updated vendor information for Sun Microsystems, Inc. Added another name to acknowledgment. Apr 08, 1997 Updates - Added clarification that the vulnerability is an implementation error and not an error in the protocol Appendix - added vendor information for Caldera and the Carnegie Mellon University Cyrus Server Acknowledgments - Added a name that was inadvertently left out ========================FORWARDED TEXT ENDS HERE============================= The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has established a Federal Computer Incident response Capability (FedCIRC) to assist federal civilians agencies in their incident handling efforts by providing proactive and reactive computer security related services. FedCIRC is a partnership among NIST, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability (CIAC), and the CERT* Coordination Center (CERT/CC). If you believe that your system has been compromised, please contact FedCIRC: Telephone: +1 888 282 0870 Email: fedcirc@fedcirc.gov Web Server: http://www.fedcirc.gov/ * Registered in U.S. Patent and Trademark Office The CERT Coordination Center is part of the Software Engineering Institute. The Software Engineering Institute is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense. CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Processed by Mailcrypt 3.3, an Emacs/PGP interface iQCVAwUBM5bci3VP+x0t4w7BAQEFUAP9GyC+xeWYSoxK0OgbwySCXhPkT76lsIMq WQOJDWppzYU7cr4YRsyfheoU2QKPP8VJCI464drOFLkqbSQmxytOEfDK/gbtqpFo Ksa/9Bb5wCHIMH3sVBMJ7/j4zxybuO9DANTlle3TqArXGnv+l/sN6H3drE01VcF2 vIs0X+yS0pE= =mdoy -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----